arXiv AI By Weimeng Wang, Ziqiang Wang, Zihang Zhan, Chuanpu Fu, Qi Li, Ke Xu

When Words Are Safe But Actions Kill: Probing Physical Jailbreak Beyond Textual Jailbreak in Hidden-State Risk Space

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arXiv Machine Learning
Jun 25

RAS: Measuring LLM Safety Through Refusal Alignment

arXiv:2606. 25750v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety evaluation of large language models (LLMs) is commonly performed by querying models with unsafe or jailbreak prompts and judging whether their outputs violate a safety policy.

By Chang-Chieh Huang, Yan-Lun Chen, Chia-Mu Yu, Wei-Bin Lee
arXiv AI
3d ago

Style Over Substance: Content-Invariant Wrappers Flip LLM Safety-Judge Verdicts

The paper investigates whether automatic safety judges evaluate the content of a model’s reply or merely its style. By keeping the reply content fixed and adding various style wrappers—such as educational disclaimers, fake reasoning blocks, or token refusals—the authors show that many judges flip their verdicts, indicating that style can influence safety judgments. The study evaluates over 600 jailbreak examples across multiple judges, revealing that some judges are highly susceptible to style-based manipulation while others remain robust.

By Yongxi Zhou, Wenbo Ye, Yuanzhe Liu, Zihan Dong, Junwei Yao
arXiv Machine Learning
Aug 11

When Skills Meet Safety: Benchmarking and Characterizing the Adaptive Jailbreak Robustness of Skill-Merged LLMs

arXiv:2608. 08542v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Model merging has become the default way to give an aligned language model new skills without retraining: a practitioner folds task vectors from math, code, or domain specialists into a safety-aligned base using task arithmetic, TIES, or DARE.

By Yu Ma, Hongli Shi, Jing Li, Xinran Xu, Weiwei Hou
Hugging Face Trending Papers
5d ago

Style Over Substance: Content-Invariant Wrappers Flip LLM Safety-Judge Verdicts

The paper investigates whether automatic safety judges evaluate the content of a model’s reply or merely its style. By adding content‑invariant style wrappers—such as educational disclaims or token refusals—to fixed replies, the authors show that many judges flip their verdicts, revealing exploitable blind spots. Across more than 600 jailbreak examples and eight judges, some judges exhibit high flip rates (e.g., GPT‑4o‑mini 19.9%) while others remain largely stable, and human validation confirms that most flips are judge errors rather than content changes.