arXiv AI By Wenpeng Xing, Bohan Yang, Mohan Li, Chunqiang Hu, Haitao Xu, Ningyu Zhang, Bo Lin, Meng Han

Latent Fusion Jailbreak: Blending Harmful and Harmless Representations to Elicit Unsafe LLM Outputs

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arXiv:2508. 10029v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Safety-aligned large language models can still be manipulated through white-box interventions that modify their internal representations.

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arXiv Computation and Language
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CASCADE Against Jailbreaks: Combination Across Stages with Controlled Attack-Defense Evaluation

The paper presents a systematic study of combining defenses against jailbreak attacks on Large Language Models across different pipeline stages. It introduces a standardized evaluation framework that defines attack-success-rate, controls query budgets, and applies explicit fairness rules. Across 19 attacks and 15 defenses, the study finds that no single defense dominates, but carefully selected combinations can provide strong safety with minimal loss of utility, offering practical guidance for layered defense pipelines.

By Jiale Luo, Eric Han
arXiv AI
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AlcaTRAz - Anchored Tree-Rule Defense Against Jailbreaks

AlcaTRAz is a prompt‑level defense that uses rule trees to insert controlled character‑level perturbations into input text, disrupting jailbreak attacks without modifying or retraining the target LLM. It operates solely on the input, making it suitable for black‑box deployments, and was evaluated on 33 open‑weight models and 22 jailbreak types, outperforming three baseline defenses in 73.4 % of model‑attack combinations. While it significantly reduces high‑severity jailbreak success, it does not eliminate it and is intended as one layer of a broader defense strategy.

By Jakub Re\v{s}, Petr Ka\v{s}ka, Martin Pere\v{s}\'ini, Martin Ukrop, Kamil Malinka
arXiv AI
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NonTextual Target Attack

arXiv:2510. 02999v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Existing gradient-based jailbreak attacks on Large Language Models (LLMs) typically optimize adversarial suffixes to align the LLM output with predefined target responses.

By Xinzhe Huang, Wenjing Hu, Tianhang Zheng, Kedong Xiu, Hongsheng Hu, Xiaojun Jia, Di Wang, Zhan Qin, Kui Ren