arXiv AI By Sarthak Choudhary, Atharv Singh Patlan, Nils Palumbo, Ashish Hooda, Kassem Fawaz, Somesh Jha

Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions

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arXiv:2605. 04209v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We present Sparse Backdoor, a supply-chain attack that plants a provably undetectable backdoor in pre-trained image classifiers, including convolutional networks and Vision Transformers.

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