arXiv:2608. 02271v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Parameter-Efficient Fine-tuned (PEFT) models are frequently downloaded from open repositories by practitioners.
By Nicola Pitzalis, Donald Shenaj, Giacomo Cignoni, Andrea Cossu, Davide Bacciu, Antonio Carta
arXiv:2608. 00732v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Backdoor attacks pose a serious threat to deep neural networks, especially when training relies on third-party data, allowing adversaries to inject malicious behaviors through data poisoning.
By Zixuan Zhu, Rui Wang, Lihua Jing, Jinwen Zhong
The paper demonstrates that a single poisoned data point can successfully create a backdoor in linear models and ReLU neural networks without needing detailed knowledge of the training data. It establishes provable conditions under which this one‑poison attack works with high probability, achieving zero backdooring error while leaving the model’s normal performance largely unaffected. The attack relies only on coarse geometric bounds of the input space and training parameters.
By Thorsten Peinemann, Paula Arnold, Sebastian Berndt, Thomas Eisenbarth, Esfandiar Mohammadi
As large language models (LLMs) are deployed in high-stakes domains, adversaries may poison training data to implant backdoors: hidden triggers that covertly manipulate model behavior at inference time. We ask whether a defender can recover such a trigger under realistic affordances, namely white-box access to the weights and knowledge of the behavior of concern, but no training data, no trusted reference model, no knowledge of the trigger, and no certainty that the model is poisoned.
arXiv:2605. 04209v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We present Sparse Backdoor, a supply-chain attack that plants a provably undetectable backdoor in pre-trained image classifiers, including convolutional networks and Vision Transformers.
By Sarthak Choudhary, Atharv Singh Patlan, Nils Palumbo, Ashish Hooda, Kassem Fawaz, Somesh Jha
Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where hidden triggers induce malicious outputs. Existing defenses generally fall into inference-time detection or training-time mitigation, but face two key limitations.