arXiv AI By John Chen, Sihan Cheng, Can Gurkan, H M Abdul Fattah

To Nuke or Not to Nuke: LLMs' (Missing) Ethical Reasoning and Actions in a High-Stakes Decision-Making Simulation

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arXiv:2606. 08310v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as long-horizon agents with decision-making capacities.

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arXiv AI
Sep 16

Position: AI Is Not Ready for Strategic Conflicts

The paper titled "Position: AI Is Not Ready for Strategic Conflicts" argues that language‑model (LM) based open‑ended strategic wargames, while useful for simulating adversaries, institutions, and crisis response, pose significant safety risks. It identifies five failure modes—decision laundering, adjudication opacity, role collapse, escalation‑through‑adjudication, and failure of strategic imagination—and contends that such wargames should not inform real‑world planning or policy without an auditable safety case. Instead, the authors suggest using these simulations primarily as stress tests to expose potential failures in decision‑influencing LM agents.

By Mark Riedl, Glenn Matlin
arXiv AI
Aug 3

Shall We Play a Game? Language Models for Open-ended Wargames

arXiv:2509. 17192v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: LLM-based social simulations can make a generated transcript look like a single behavioral signal, but the model behind that transcript may be doing several different jobs: choosing what an actor says or does, deciding what happens after an action, or both.

By Glenn Matlin, Isaac Song, Yixiong Hao, Parv Mahajan, Evan Montoya, Ryan Bard, Stuart R. Topp, Anthony Wen-Ming Zang, Mohammed Rehan Parwani, Soham Shetty, Mark Riedl
arXiv AI
Sep 21

Why Do LLMs Struggle in Strategic Play? Broken Links Between Observations, Beliefs, and Actions

The paper investigates why large language models (LLMs) struggle in strategic decision-making under incomplete information. It identifies two key gaps: an observation‑belief gap where LLMs’ internal representations of game states are accurate but brittle, and a belief‑action gap where converting these internal beliefs into actions is weak, leading to suboptimal payoffs. Experiments with Llama 3.1, Qwen3, and gpt‑oss confirm that acting optimally on decoded beliefs would improve outcomes in most games, highlighting a bottleneck in belief‑to‑action conversion.

By Jan Sobotka, Mustafa O. Karabag, Ufuk Topcu