The Target Agent Is Its Own Best Critic but a Poor Proposer: Self-Improved Red Teaming
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arXiv:2610.34965v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Automatic red teaming increasingly relies on large language models (LLMs) to iteratively diagnose failed attacks and propose improved adversarial pro...
The paper introduces the SAST-IR framework to evaluate large language models’ robustness against persuasion attacks in a memory‑less setting, revealing a flaw called "Refusal Inertia" that masks true vulnerability. Using the CP‑Agent and a custom CounterFact‑Strict dataset, the authors demonstrate that simple, diverse attack strategies achieve a 96% success rate, while complex attacks often trigger defensive compliance. The study highlights severe brittleness in current state‑of‑the‑art models when deprived of conversation history.
arXiv:2608. 10669v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents combine language-based reasoning with external tools to perform complex tasks.
arXiv:2606. 24589v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Scaling adversarial evaluation of large language models requires both a method for generating hard inputs and a reliable way to confirm that resulting failures are real.
The paper introduces ReMAS, a reinforcement learning-based framework for black-box red-teaming of multi-agent systems (MAS) that fine-tunes attacker LLMs to craft adversarial prompts. ReMAS operates in two stages: a rewrite stage that refines base attack prompts to boost extraction success, and a template generation stage that builds attack templates to better invoke specific sub-agents and expose their system prompts. Experiments demonstrate that ReMAS significantly outperforms existing black-box attacks, showing high success rates and transferability across different backend LLMs and MAS structures.
arXiv:2609.36570v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Indirect prompt injection makes an LLM agent treat untrusted retrieved text as instructions. We present CounterSteer, an inference-time defense that...