arXiv:2604. 04385v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We localize the policy routing mechanism in alignment-trained language models.
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arXiv:2609.25602v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In language models, the choice between believing the prompt and believing the weights is made by a handful of identifiable attention heads. Instruction...
The paper introduces a three-level evaluation framework—behavioral deployment, LM-head readout, and probe recoverability—to distinguish whether a language model fails a syntactic test by not encoding structure or by failing to use it. Using a trilingual control-dependency benchmark, the authors find that probe recoverability consistently exceeds LM-head readout, which in turn exceeds behavioral deployment across seven models and three languages, with the largest gap observed in Qwen3-0.6B Instruct. Layer-localized activation patching shows that instruction tuning shifts the decoded layer later, suggesting decoding favors surface shortcuts and that behavioral evaluation understates what models encode while probing alone overstates what they deploy.
arXiv:2609.38205v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: System prompts are the primary lever practitioners use to control language model behavior, yet what they actually do to the computation inside the tran...
The paper investigates where the ‘refusal’ behavior of language models resides across different architectures. It finds that a single direction in the residual stream governs refusal in transformers, and that the same direction—after a rigid rotation—also governs refusal in state‑space models (SSMs). By aligning these directions and applying a detector‑triggered gate, the authors demonstrate that refusal can be effectively transferred across transformer, SSM, recurrent, and hybrid architectures, showing that safety tooling can be ported by re‑estimating the direction at each architecture’s write site rather than rebuilding it from scratch.
arXiv:2606. 22686v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Modern Large Language Models (LLMs) rely on extensive safety alignment, yet the mechanistic basis of refusal remains opaque.
arXiv:2608. 11583v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety alignment in large language models is often treated as a distributed property of the entire network, yet its practical brittleness suggests that refusal behavior may be concentrated in a smaller set of parameters.