arXiv:2605. 14879v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Many intelligent computing and autonomous systems rely on multiple independent, often learning, agents repeatedly sharing a limited resource.
By Nikolaos Al. Papadopoulos, Ismael Tito Freire, Marti Sanchez-Fibla, Konstantinos E. Psannis
arXiv:2607. 04470v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) offer a natural interface for translating human objectives into reward signals for cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), yet the training-time dynamics of this integration remain poorly understood.
By Faid Keddouri, Sohaib Houhou, Aissa Boulmerka, Nadir Farhi
The paper investigates the problem of sharing a single critic across multiple parallel environments in reinforcement learning. It shows that when environments assign different expected returns to the same state, a shared critic must reconcile conflicting value targets, which can distort advantage estimates and misguide policy updates. The authors propose a simple fix—providing the critic with the environment index—demonstrating through bandit models and experiments on CartPole, MuJoCo, BipedalWalker, and 16 Procgen games that this conditional critic stabilizes learning and boosts returns, achieving a 40.8% improvement in aggregate normalized return on unseen levels.
By Zhenya Liu, Yang Meng, Zhuokai Zhao, Xuefeng Liu, Yuxin Chen
The paper introduces CURB, a reward‑shaping framework that penalizes the total variation distance between an agent’s action distributions under cooperation and defection histories, thereby preventing collusive equilibria in repeated games. By linking empirical Q‑learning collusion to Simple Penal Codes, the authors prove that any non‑trivial SPC can be neutralized, and demonstrate CURB’s effectiveness in both tabular and deep Q‑learning settings for Bertrand and Cournot competition.
By Karthik Sivachandran, Rohan Paleja
arXiv:2606. 11284v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Real-world multi-agent systems, from traffic coordination to resource allocation, are often modeled as general-sum games where individual incentives conflict with collective welfare.
By Wongyu Lee, Francesco Lelli, Omran Ayoub, Massimo Tornatore
arXiv:2610.00619v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: In this paper, we extend earlier findings of supra-competitive outcomes in optimal-execution games by identifying a learned punitive mechanism that d...
By Christos Spyridon Koulouris, Carlo Campajola