Surprisal Theory is Tautological (without Rational Grounding)
Read the original on arXiv Computation and Language →The Flow has not summarised this story yet — read it at arXiv Computation and Language.
The Flow has not summarised this story yet — read it at arXiv Computation and Language.
Surprisal theory holds that the human processing difficulty of a linguistic unit in context is an affine function of its surprisal under some language model. I argue this claim is a tautology without further constraint: for any non-negative difficulty measure over units in context, there exists a language model whose surprisal is an affine function of it under mild technical conditions.
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The article argues that Surprisal Theory, often presented as a computational-level explanation, is not a theory in its own right. It contends that using large language model (LLM) surprisals without considering the underlying representational and algorithmic choices obscures the theory’s commitments. The authors demonstrate through three analyses that algorithm and architecture significantly influence language model probabilities, urging researchers to reassess treating LLM surprisals as interchangeable.
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