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arXiv AI By Seungho Lee, Changbin Lee

Subjects, Not Authors: The Authorship Hazard in Agentic Dataspaces

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The paper discusses the "authorship hazard" in agentic dataspaces, where AI agents can draft and publish governance artifacts without human approval. It argues that agents should be treated as subjects of governance, not authors, and proposes mechanisms to enforce this, such as closing the authorization channel and treating drafting as an enforcement problem. Experiments show that unapproved agent drafts can reverse many authorization decisions, highlighting the need for robust review processes.

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