Modern AI coding-agent harnesses (Claude Code, Codex CLI, Cursor) rest their security boundary on a largely unexamined assumption: that the action A a human approves is the same action A' the harness...
The paper "Approve What, Exactly? Effect Binding and Trusted Rendering for Agent Step-Up Authorization" examines how AI agents seek approval before performing actions such as sending money or deleting files. It identifies twelve attack vectors on the approval process and evaluates them against several protocols, finding that many agent runtimes lack verifiable approval records and exhibit binding weaknesses. The authors propose a defense called ASU (Agent Step-Up), which renders a canonical approval card, requires a phone passkey, and enforces single-use execution, demonstrating strong protection against substitution, replay, and grant-stretching attacks in extensive simulations.
By Sai Varun Kodathala, Prashanth Pollishetty, Jaylen Cargill
arXiv:2610.27620v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Autonomous LLM agents act through tools under per-action authorization: a local guard screens each tool call in isolation. We show that local authori...
By Anmol Pandey, Aditya Jain, Liang Chen, Carsten Maple
The paper introduces a protocol for cross‑interface authorization of AI computer‑use agents, ensuring that policy decisions remain consistent across graphical interfaces, command lines, APIs, scripts, and Model Context Protocol servers. It defines a profile‑bounded system that enumerates all effect‑bearing routes, normalizes requests to canonical effects, issues prepare tickets, and re‑verifies all relevant state at commit time, requiring a sink receipt for a committed result. Extensive testing across two runtime mappings produced thousands of traces, with rigorous checks confirming no semantic regressions, mutant rejections, and correct outcome matching.
By Genliang Zhu, Chu Wang
The paper introduces Runtime Assurance Contracts (RAC) as a formal policy framework for high‑risk AI agents, addressing the "assurance‑transition gap" by binding autonomy boundaries, component eligibility, evidence state, transition policy, human‑review capacity, and non‑compensatory gates. RAC allows soft metrics to influence routing while mandating retries, switches, escalations, deferrals, or stops when mandatory gates fail or are unknown, ensuring aggregate performance cannot alone authorize action. The authors define the contract, evidence record, permission rule, and five invariants, and evaluate RAC through deterministic failure‑injection studies, hand‑authored traces, and a prospective synthetic holdout, comparing it to score‑only and restricted protocol baselines.
By Serhii Zabolotnii
arXiv:2610.33112v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Use-based AI regulation assigns obligations by deployment risk but lacks an evidentiary object to carry them. A benchmark score is a property of a mode...
By John deVadoss
arXiv:2607. 25364v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Tool-using agents expose structured calls but commonly attach free-form rationales.
By Genliang Zhu (Accentrust, Georgia Institute of Technology), Chu Wang (Accentrust, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign)
The paper "From Approval to Abuse: Privilege Escalation Attacks on Harness-Protected Coding Agents" examines how coding agents that use execution harnesses to enforce permission boundaries can be tricked into granting overly broad allow-rules. By planting adversarial context in a repository, attackers can steer an agent into requesting a plausibly justified yet dangerously wide permission, which, if approved, lets the agent bypass the harness and execute malicious actions without further human oversight. Experiments on platforms such as Claude Code and Codex CLI show that 58% of trials succeed in eliciting such rules, which then cover 56.9% of category-specific capability tests and enable silent goal completion in 81% of approved cases, thereby undermining the safety promise of human-in-the-loop oversight.
By Xianglin Yang, Yechao Zhang, Jiahao Liu, Yulin Chen, Yuxin Cao, Bryan Hooi, Jiaheng Zhang
AcquireBound is a runtime authorization framework that ensures AI agents can safely acquire and activate resources such as compute, credentials, and services. It quarantines acquired outputs, resolves their capabilities through authenticated evidence, and activates them only after verifying a manifest, provenance, and relational constraints. The system demonstrates strong safety properties, passing extensive benign and unsafe trace tests across multiple resource classes.
By Genliang Zhu
arXiv:2607. 10487v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM agents can commit durable effects from authority evidence that was valid earlier in execution: a DOM snapshot, approval epoch, version witness, branch token, or worker result.
By Igor Santos-Grueiro
arXiv:2609.14744v2 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: By acquiring compute, credentials, accounts, services, and other agents, autonomous AI agents can introduce new authority into a task. Payment, bud...
By Genliang Zhu (Accentrust, Georgia Institute of Technology), Chu Wang (Accentrust, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign)
ClawSentry is an open‑source, framework‑agnostic security supervision gateway designed to protect autonomous large language model (LLM) agents from progressive risks that can arise at four points in the agent control loop: skill admission, invocation‑time intent, execution‑time effect, and post‑action consequence. It introduces a multi‑tier decision engine—deterministic L1, rule‑anchored L2, and read‑only L3—alongside a First‑Use Skill Package Review (FSPR) and an Agent Harness Protocol (AHP) that applies a single policy across multiple agent runtimes without modifying their internals. Evaluation on SkillInject and the SkillsSafety benchmark shows that ClawSentry significantly reduces contextual adversarial skill risk (ASR) while maintaining high task success rates (TSR).
By Kai Wang, Zeming Wei, BiaoJie Zeng, Chang Jin, An Wang, Xiaokun Luan, Zhixiao Lin, Jingjing Qu, Xia Hu, Xingcheng Xu