arXiv:2606. 26185v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM-as-judge ("grader") components are now standard in evaluation harnesses, including safety evaluations where a pass/fail verdict may gate downstream deployment decisions.
By Hiroki Tamba
arXiv:2606. 29581v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Modern LLM deployments routinely compress models and raise sampling temperature to reduce cost, latency, or repetition, yet safety evaluations usually treat these choices as fixed implementation details.
By Hari Prasad, Ritam Pal
arXiv:2608. 02665v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A benchmark score is a measurement instrument, yet most benchmarks read each item at a single canonical surface form.
By Yongxi Zhou, Junwei Yao, Yuanzhe Liu, Zihan Dong, Wenbo Ye, Jiaxi Wen, Lai Yun Choi
Modern LLM deployments routinely compress models and raise sampling temperature to reduce cost, latency, or repetition, yet safety evaluations usually treat these choices as fixed implementation details. This leaves a practical uncertainty: does a model that is safe at FP16 and greedy decoding remain safe after it is quantized and sampled stochastically, or do the two deployment knobs amplify one another?
Safety-Flag is a unified benchmark that consolidates seven popular safety datasets into a single balanced flag/do‑not‑flag protocol, providing item‑level decisions and confidence scores for multiple large language models and dedicated guards. The benchmark evaluates moderator reliability across three dimensions—error direction, probability calibration, and confidence‑based error ranking—revealing that aggregate accuracy masks significant differences, such as one model flagging 85% of benign content while another misses 54% of harmful content. The study shows that general‑purpose models are overconfident, but temperature tuning can substantially improve calibration, and confidence‑based abstention can reduce selective risk, though performance varies with how well confidence ranks errors.
By Yibo Hu
arXiv:2606. 25097v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Speculative decoding accelerates inference by letting a draft model propose tokens for a target model to verify, raising a concrete safety question: at temperature zero, can draft-side behavior leak into safety-scored outputs?
By Sahil Kadadekar
The study examines how two small instruction‑tuned language models, Qwen2.5‑1.5B and Llama‑3.2‑1B, respond to user pushback on TriviaQA. When initially correct, the models flip to a wrong answer in about 42–43% of cases, with the effectiveness of different pushback styles varying by model. Attempts to decode capitulation from the pre‑response residual stream fail under a rigorous validation protocol, revealing overfitting and a measurement hazard that underestimates capitulation by 18–24 percentage points.
By Saad Aamir, Muhammad Awais Bin Adil
The paper introduces two scaling laws that predict the performance of safety probes—tools used to monitor language models for harmful behavior—based on model size and the number of labeled examples. By creating six large safety datasets and training probes across multiple model families, the authors show that probe error decreases as a power law with model size and further improves with more examples, with the improvement rate increasing for larger models. These laws enable researchers to forecast probe accuracy and decide whether to invest in more data or a larger model to achieve a desired error threshold.
By Yuchen Wu (University of Washington), Jerry Wei (Anthropic)
arXiv:2607. 01951v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly consulted on contested scientific questions, raising the concern that they will sycophantically retreat from established consensus when a user signals doubt -- drifting toward a false balance that treats settled science as one view among several.
By Minjong Cheon
arXiv:2511. 00382v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Organizations increasingly adapt Large Language Models (LLMs) from public repositories such as HuggingFace to downstream tasks.
By Mina Taraghi, Yann Pequignot, Amin Nikanjam, Mohamed Amine Merzouk, Foutse Khomh
arXiv:2610.14443v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Model cards, system cards, and safety reports increasingly document LLM safety behaviors, yet safety evaluations typically start from predefined benc...
By Kausar Moshood, Jace Bolante, Roshan Aditya Murali, Manish Motwani
arXiv:2610.16761v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: LLM-based information systems need safety guardrails. Most guardrails classify the prompt alone. If the prompt looks harmful, the system rejects it bef...
By Ram Vikas Mishra, Shashank Aggarwal, Jahnavi Kumar, Amit Awekar