arXiv AI
Signed but Not Safe: Requirement Integrity in Multi-Agent LLM Handoffs
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arXiv AI
Oct 1
Janus: Evidence-Before-Effect Sagas and Offline-Verifiable Provenance for Agentic LLMs
arXiv:2609.38266v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agentic large language models (LLMs) now move money through tools, yet the record of what they did is usually a trace their own process emits beside...
arXiv AI
Aug 19
PACE: Policy-Attested Contract Execution for Safe AI Agents in Decentralized Finance
The paper introduces PACE (Policy‑Attested Contract Execution), a framework that sits between large‑language‑model (LLM) based autonomous AI agents and on‑chain DeFi operations. PACE defines typed transaction intents, a deterministic policy verifier, and signed Policy Decision Records (PDRs) that cryptographically bind an approved intent, policy, and simulation report to the exact on‑chain execution bytes, providing replay and expiration protection. In evaluations across 40 tasks and six baselines, PACE achieves zero unsafe executions and zero false positives, outperforming unguarded agents by a large margin.
arXiv AI
Aug 24
Calibrating Criterion Revision in LLM Agents: Failure Modes and a Trace-Anchored Protocol
The paper introduces a framework for evaluating how large language model agents revise their success criteria after failures, defining five non‑compensatory conditions that must be met for a criterion revision to be considered valid. Using the CMB‑0.1 protocol, the authors test twelve cross‑domain scenarios across four system configurations, finding that no model trial satisfies all five conditions and highlighting specific failure modes such as zero‑state reconstruction and inadequate intervention sensitivity. They propose a more stringent trace‑anchored CMB‑0.4 protocol to better isolate and measure criterion revision in future studies.
arXiv AI
Jul 23
Guardrails as Scapegoats: Auditing Unfaithful Safety Refusals in Tool-Augmented LLM Agents
arXiv:2607. 19449v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Evaluation frameworks for tool-augmented LLM agents focus overwhelmingly on capability metrics or explicit tool crashes, leaving silent infrastructure failures and HTTP 200 responses with empty, null, or malformed payloads largely unaudited.
arXiv AI
Oct 2
Proof-Gated Signing: Solver-Checked Transaction Guards that Hold Under State Drift for Onchain AI Agents
Proof‑Gated Signing (PGS) is a method for securing on‑chain AI agents that control wallets by simulating proposed transactions, extracting their effects, and using an SMT solver to verify a declarative value‑and‑permission policy across a range of oracle‑uncertainty prices. PGS then compiles on‑chain post‑conditions—such as wallet balance bounds, payee receipts, allowance caps, and ownership checks—ensuring that any execution satisfying these conditions also satisfies the policy, even when the chain state drifts due to front‑running, contract upgrades, or token‑parameter changes. In a testbed of 260 scenarios, PGS prevented 93.6 % of harmful cases and passed 97.5 % of benign ones, outperforming simulation‑only checking and static allowlists, while incurring about 41 k gas and 0.1–0.2 s per check.
arXiv AI
Sep 1
VERA: Authority-Preserving Edge Revocation for Federated AI-Agent Workflows
arXiv:2608.30091v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Modern agent frameworks compose planners, tool agents, remote services, and shared specialists into runtime delegation graphs, but their revocation API...