arXiv AI
Oct 16

Approve What, Exactly? Effect Binding and Trusted Rendering for Agent Step-Up Authorization

The paper "Approve What, Exactly? Effect Binding and Trusted Rendering for Agent Step-Up Authorization" examines how AI agents seek approval before performing actions such as sending money or deleting files. It identifies twelve attack vectors on the approval process and evaluates them against several protocols, finding that many agent runtimes lack verifiable approval records and exhibit binding weaknesses. The authors propose a defense called ASU (Agent Step-Up), which renders a canonical approval card, requires a phone passkey, and enforces single-use execution, demonstrating strong protection against substitution, replay, and grant-stretching attacks in extensive simulations.

By Sai Varun Kodathala, Prashanth Pollishetty, Jaylen Cargill
arXiv AI
Sep 3

ClaimReceipt: Verifying Evidence Sufficiency and Coverage in Agent Evaluations

The paper introduces ClaimReceipt, a specification and verifier that checks whether a claim in an agent evaluation can be recomputed from retained evidence (sufficiency) and whether the evidence covers the entire experiment set (coverage). Using the CR‑2 verifier on 1,392 historical records, the authors demonstrate accurate reproduction of audit verdicts, non‑redundant field groups, and zero false positives on semantic faults. In a prospective CR‑3 run, the system correctly flags missing receipts and preserves coverage when private evidence is withheld, while adding minimal overhead to inference time and transaction size.

By Peiying Zhu, Sidi Chang
arXiv AI
Oct 23

Correlated Failures of AI Approval Monitors

The paper investigates how AI approval monitors can fail together when they share a base model or poisoned input, using concepts from distributed computing to identify vulnerable monitor sets. Experiments on twelve open‑weight monitors and several closed models show that fooling a monitor into approving fraud is limited to its own evidence source, while blocking correct payments requires overcoming injection resistance. A rule that counts distinct evidence sources rather than votes reduces false rejections, and adding a rule engine that cannot be persuaded restores safety and liveness against the measured attacks.

By Luca Zanolini
arXiv AI
Nov 6

Signed but Not Safe: Requirement Integrity in Multi-Agent LLM Handoffs

The paper investigates how to preserve user‑specified requirements when enterprise AI agents hand off tasks to subagents. It compares free‑text, structured JSON, and signed requirement‑manifest handoffs, showing that signing the manifest with HMAC‑SHA256 dramatically reduces unsafe commits (from 69.4% to 9.0%) while maintaining compliance. The study also demonstrates that deterministic verification outperforms LLM‑based checking and that the main remaining risk lies in the extraction step before signing.

By Xiaobo Chen, Genliang Zhu, Ziyuan Wang, Chu Wang
arXiv AI
Aug 24

Calibrating Criterion Revision in LLM Agents: Failure Modes and a Trace-Anchored Protocol

The paper introduces a framework for evaluating how large language model agents revise their success criteria after failures, defining five non‑compensatory conditions that must be met for a criterion revision to be considered valid. Using the CMB‑0.1 protocol, the authors test twelve cross‑domain scenarios across four system configurations, finding that no model trial satisfies all five conditions and highlighting specific failure modes such as zero‑state reconstruction and inadequate intervention sensitivity. They propose a more stringent trace‑anchored CMB‑0.4 protocol to better isolate and measure criterion revision in future studies.

By Guodong Xu