arXiv AI By Bravish Ghosh

Proof-Gated Signing: Solver-Checked Transaction Guards that Hold Under State Drift for Onchain AI Agents

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Proof‑Gated Signing (PGS) is a method for securing on‑chain AI agents that control wallets by simulating proposed transactions, extracting their effects, and using an SMT solver to verify a declarative value‑and‑permission policy across a range of oracle‑uncertainty prices. PGS then compiles on‑chain post‑conditions—such as wallet balance bounds, payee receipts, allowance caps, and ownership checks—ensuring that any execution satisfying these conditions also satisfies the policy, even when the chain state drifts due to front‑running, contract upgrades, or token‑parameter changes. In a testbed of 260 scenarios, PGS prevented 93.6 % of harmful cases and passed 97.5 % of benign ones, outperforming simulation‑only checking and static allowlists, while incurring about 41 k gas and 0.1–0.2 s per check.

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