arXiv AI
VERA: Authority-Preserving Edge Revocation for Federated AI-Agent Workflows
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arXiv AI
Sep 21
Authorization Revocation for Long-Running AI Agents: Root-Scoped Quiescence under Delegation and Asynchronous Execution
arXiv:2609.21284v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Long-running AI agents outlive initiating processes through credentials, delegated tasks, queues, callbacks, reservations, and provider-side operatio...
arXiv AI
Jul 14
Temporary Authority, Permanent Effects: Commit-Time Authorization for LLM Agents
arXiv:2607. 10487v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM agents can commit durable effects from authority evidence that was valid earlier in execution: a DOM snapshot, approval epoch, version witness, branch token, or worker result.
arXiv AI
Sep 21
Runtime Authorization for Resources Acquired by AI Agents
arXiv:2609.14744v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: By acquiring compute, credentials, accounts, services, and other agents, autonomous AI agents can introduce new authority into a task. Payment, bud...
arXiv AI
Sep 2
Delegation Without Trust: An Empirical Gap Analysis of Identity, Authorization, and Runtime Governance in Multi-Agent LLM Systems
The paper examines the security challenges of delegating authority to autonomous LLM agents that act on users’ behalf. It introduces a threat model with four adversaries and eight security requirements, demonstrates that current frameworks (LangGraph, CrewAI, AutoGen, MCP) fail to meet these standards, and presents an authorization broker that blocks all identified threats with minimal overhead. The broker is shown to resist numerous attacks and limits compromised sub‑agents to their delegated tasks, and its principles are implemented in VotalAI’s LLM Shield.
arXiv AI
Sep 15
AcquireBound: Runtime Authorization for Resources Acquired by AI Agents
AcquireBound is a runtime authorization framework that ensures AI agents can safely acquire and activate resources such as compute, credentials, and services. It quarantines acquired outputs, resolves their capabilities through authenticated evidence, and activates them only after verifying a manifest, provenance, and relational constraints. The system demonstrates strong safety properties, passing extensive benign and unsafe trace tests across multiple resource classes.
arXiv AI
Sep 23
NostrAgent: A Decentralized Identity and Delegation Architecture for Sovereign Agentic Systems
arXiv:2609.22944v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Autonomous AI agents increasingly act across organizational boundaries on behalf of human operators: they invoke third-party services, delegate subta...