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arXiv Machine Learning By Dominik Dahlem, Rui Vieira

ServeGuard: Verifiable, Bounded-Residual Confinement of Operator-Invisible Channels Without Revealing the Certified Read Factor

Read the original on arXiv Machine Learning →

ServeGuard is a supply‑chain primitive that allows a publisher to ship a proof‑carrying adapter for an open‑weight language model, proving in zero‑knowledge that the adapter contains no hidden backdoor channel in the monitor’s blind subspace. The proof is inexpensive because it relies on a deterministic function of the public base model, and the served residual is the model’s own public floor. The system lets consumers or regulators verify the absence of this class of hidden channels without revealing the certified read factor or trusting the publisher.

Machine-generated by The Flow from the publisher's headline and feed description — not written or checked by a human. The full article lives at arXiv Machine Learning.

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