arXiv:2607. 24893v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Multi-agent LLM systems can be attacked by a payload that no single agent ever holds in full: a poisoned tool hides encrypted fragments in its observations, spreads them across several agents, and an external step reassembles and executes them after the run.
By Diego Fernandez Arias, Dev Prashant Mistry, Ren Wang, Yibo Hu
arXiv:2608. 00583v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Chain-of-thought (CoT) monitoring is meant to catch the reward hacks that look clean in the actions and betray themselves only in the reasoning.
By Shikhar Shiromani, Leo Richter
arXiv:2607. 19321v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As AI agents begin to automate AI R&D, we need ways to assess whether their outputs are safe to deploy, even when the agents themselves may be untrusted.
By Lena Libon, Ben Rank, Jehyeok Yeon, David Schmotz, Jeremy Qin, Daniel Donnelly, Derck Prinzhorn, Maksym Andriushchenko
arXiv:2607. 02514v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As AI coding agents become more autonomous, they increasingly ship code iteratively, with the codebase persisting across sessions.
By Josh Hills, Ida Caspary, Asa Cooper Stickland
arXiv:2505. 14300v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: White-box monitoring is increasingly adopted as an auditing tool as Large Language Models (LLMs) are deployed in daily operations to ensure safe model behavior.
By Maheep Chaudhary, Fazl Barez
arXiv:2608. 02698v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Tool-using agents built on large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed not by a single operator but by many, side by side on shared infrastructure.
By Mohamed Chahine Ghanem