arXiv Computation and Language
Oct 27

SEMA-Auto: Sighted and Efficient Multi-Turn Attack with Autonomy

arXiv:2610.35743v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Existing jailbreak attackers fall into two classes: static planners fix their single- or multi-turn adversarial plans in advance, remaining simple but...

By Mingqian Feng, Xiaodong Liu, Weiwei Yang, Chenliang Xu, Jialin Song, Qiyao Ma, Chengquan Guo, Carolyn Buractaon, Christopher White, Jianfeng Gao
arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 14

SaFeR-Steer: Evolving Multi-Turn MLLMs via Synthetic Bootstrapping and Feedback Dynamics

SaFeR-Steer is a progressive multi‑turn alignment framework that uses staged synthetic bootstrapping and tutor‑in‑the‑loop GRPO to train a single student model against adaptive, on‑policy attacks. It introduces Trajectory‑Consistent Summative Reward (TCSR) to ensure that low‑quality turns impact the overall trajectory reward. The authors release the STEER dataset and demonstrate that SaFeR‑Steer significantly improves safety and helpfulness on both single‑turn and multi‑turn benchmarks for Qwen2.5‑VL models.

By Haolong Hu, Hanyu Li, Tiancheng He, Huahui Yi, An Zhang, Qiankun Li, Kun Wang, Yang Liu, Zhigang Zeng
arXiv AI
Oct 26

$M^3$: A Multi-LLM System for Multi-Turn Jailbreaking as a Markov Decision Process

$M^3$ is an automated red‑teaming framework that models multi‑turn jailbreaking as a finite‑horizon Markov Decision Process. It lets an attacker LLM interact with a target LLM while using a state LLM to maintain a compact internal state. Across two benchmarks and six target models, $M^3$ outperforms existing methods, boosting attack success rates by up to 53% at five turns and improving consistency and risk escalation metrics.

By Yuqing Huang, Jack Ji, Jithin Pradeep, Sagarika Suresh, Jekaterina Novikova
arXiv Machine Learning
Jun 26

Jailbreaking for the Average Jane: Choosing Optimal Jailbreaks via Bandit Algorithms for Automatically Enhanced Queries

arXiv:2606. 26936v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: With a profusion of jailbreaks for LLMs now widely known, a growing concern is that non-expert malicious actors ("the average Jane") could elicit actionable responses to malicious requests.

By Prarabdh Shukla, Ritik, Suhas Rao, Arpit Agarwal, Arjun Bhagoji