arXiv AI By Yuqing Huang, Jack Ji, Jithin Pradeep, Sagarika Suresh, Jekaterina Novikova

$M^3$: A Multi-LLM System for Multi-Turn Jailbreaking as a Markov Decision Process

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$M^3$ is an automated red‑teaming framework that models multi‑turn jailbreaking as a finite‑horizon Markov Decision Process. It lets an attacker LLM interact with a target LLM while using a state LLM to maintain a compact internal state. Across two benchmarks and six target models, $M^3$ outperforms existing methods, boosting attack success rates by up to 53% at five turns and improving consistency and risk escalation metrics.

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