arXiv Machine Learning By Prarabdh Shukla, Ritik, Suhas Rao, Arpit Agarwal, Arjun Bhagoji

Jailbreaking for the Average Jane: Choosing Optimal Jailbreaks via Bandit Algorithms for Automatically Enhanced Queries

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arXiv:2606. 26936v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: With a profusion of jailbreaks for LLMs now widely known, a growing concern is that non-expert malicious actors ("the average Jane") could elicit actionable responses to malicious requests.

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arXiv AI
Jun 11

JailbreakOPT: Tool-Assisted Iterative Jailbreak Prompt Optimization

arXiv:2606. 11425v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Jailbreak attacks expose persistent safety weaknesses in large language models (LLMs), but existing stateless single-turn methods face a trade-off: hand-crafted prompts are expressive but static, while iterative prompt optimization can adapt but often relies on low-level mutations that require many target queries.

By Ge Shi, Jun Yin, Donglin Xie, Fangyi Liu, Yucan Li, Menglin Liu
arXiv AI
Jun 2

Claudini: Autoresearch Discovers State-of-the-Art Adversarial Attack Algorithms for LLMs

arXiv:2603. 24511v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We show that AI agents are capable of discovering novel algorithms for adversarial attacks against LLMs, advancing the state of the art on white-box jailbreaking and prompt injection evaluations.

By Alexander Panfilov, Peter Romov, Igor Shilov, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye, Jonas Geiping, Maksym Andriushchenko
arXiv AI
Sep 7

AlcaTRAz - Anchored Tree-Rule Defense Against Jailbreaks

AlcaTRAz is a prompt‑level defense that uses rule trees to insert controlled character‑level perturbations into input text, disrupting jailbreak attacks without modifying or retraining the target LLM. It operates solely on the input, making it suitable for black‑box deployments, and was evaluated on 33 open‑weight models and 22 jailbreak types, outperforming three baseline defenses in 73.4 % of model‑attack combinations. While it significantly reduces high‑severity jailbreak success, it does not eliminate it and is intended as one layer of a broader defense strategy.

By Jakub Re\v{s}, Petr Ka\v{s}ka, Martin Pere\v{s}\'ini, Martin Ukrop, Kamil Malinka