arXiv:2606. 18530v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Domain-camouflaged injection attacks embed malicious instructions in retrieved content using domain-appropriate vocabulary, evading standard detectors that rely on syntactic injection markers.
By Aaditya Pai
arXiv:2606. 27567v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Prompt injection is the top security risk for LLM-integrated applications, yet every defense proposed so far has been broken.
By Dewank Pant, Shruti Lohani, Avijit Kumar
arXiv:2607. 26639v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A self-check defense asks the target model to assess a request before answering it; SAGE, the strongest published instance, reports an average 99% defense success rate.
By Haoyu Zhang, Shibo Zheng, Xiangchen Guan, Zhuoxi Wang, Zijian Xiao, Mohammad Zandsalimy, Shanu Sushmita
arXiv:2606. 13385v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Web agents driven by large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world environments, where they operate over untrusted web content and execute actions with direct consequences.
By Zihao Wang, Yiming Li, Yutong Wu, Zheyu Liu, Kangjie Chen, Fok Kar Wai, Pin-Yu Chen, Vrizlynn L. L. Thing, Bo Li, Dacheng Tao, Tianwei Zhang
arXiv:2606. 15057v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Indirect prompt injection (IPI) is a major security threat to LLM-powered agents.
By Xinhang Ma, Taoran Li, Chaowei Xiao, Zhiyuan Yu, Ning Zhang, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
arXiv:2608. 08027v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Prompt injection is a critical security threat in large language model (LLM) applications, where attackers hijack model behavior by embedding malicious instructions in user or external data.
By Laiqiao Qin, Tianqing Zhu, Longxiang Gao, Wanlei Zhou