Reinforcing the World's Edge: A Continual Learning Problem in the Multi-Agent-World Boundary
Read the original on arXiv AI →The paper studies a stationary decentralized Markov game where a focal agent experiences drifting rewards and dynamics due to learning peers, framing this as an agent‑centric continual reinforcement‑learning problem. It introduces the concept of an invariant core—maximal abstract patterns common to many successful trajectories—and proves a worst‑case conditioning theorem linking trajectory‑law drift to success coverage. The authors provide theoretical guarantees for survival horizon, first‑exit law, and regret, and validate their predictions with solvable models and empirical studies in continual control, cue‑MNIST, and Level‑Based Foraging.
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