arXiv:2606. 26627v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model agents increasingly query databases, search document collections, call external APIs, remember past interactions, and act on a user's behalf.
By Nada Lahjouji, Ashwin Gerard Colaco
arXiv:2606. 17114v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI agents are increasingly being adopted in enterprise and personal settings with access to emails, databases, documents, and other tools where they can read, update, and disseminate sensitive information.
By Hankyul Baek, Jaewon Noh, Sang Seo, Yongsu Kim, Gabriel Waikin Loh Matienzo, Young Il Kim, Ee Wei Seah, Akriti Vij
The paper discusses the "authorship hazard" in agentic dataspaces, where AI agents can draft and publish governance artifacts without human approval. It argues that agents should be treated as subjects of governance, not authors, and proposes mechanisms to enforce this, such as closing the authorization channel and treating drafting as an enforcement problem. Experiments show that unapproved agent drafts can reverse many authorization decisions, highlighting the need for robust review processes.
By Seungho Lee, Changbin Lee
The paper discusses the trustworthiness of agentic AI systems built on large language models, highlighting new security and operational risks such as indirect prompt injection, memory contamination, and cross‑session data leakage. It categorizes failure modes, reviews mitigation strategies—including instruction hierarchies, context isolation, and constrained tool use—and introduces the Trustworthy Agent Development Lifecycle (TADL), a six‑phase framework for specification, design, training, evaluation, deployment, and monitoring. The authors note that TADL has not yet been empirically validated but offers a structured foundation for developing more secure and accountable agentic systems, and they call for improved benchmarks and future research priorities.
By Fayeq Jeelani Syed, Rehan Ahmad, Ali Al Bataineh, Aakriti Adhikari
The paper introduces Governance-as-Code (GaC), a framework that translates the EU AI Act’s technical requirements into 43 machine‑checkable acceptance criteria across six compliance modules. GaC runs within a CI/CD pipeline, producing Article‑indexed audit evidence and providing actual Rego policy code. The authors validate GaC on two enterprise deployments, showing it reproduces manual audit findings—including three penalty‑triggering violations—while reducing audit labor by about 75%.
By Rudrendu Kumar Paul, Sourav Nandy
BodhiPromptShield is a policy‑aware mediation layer for LLM agent pipelines that detects sensitive text spans before they propagate, replacing them with typed placeholders, semantic abstractions, or secure tokens and restoring them only at authorized execution boundaries. In evaluations on AI4Privacy, PrivacyLens, and AgentDojo datasets, the system reduces identifier exposure to 7.4% and 1.8% respectively, and limits exact identifier leakage in final actions to 2.1–3.1%. While mediation preserves factual content according to automated metrics, human annotations show a significant drop in inferability from 100% to 24–53%, indicating the need for human validation of semantic‑leakage measures.
By Bo Ma, Jinsong Wu, Weiqi Yan