arXiv:2606. 26627v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model agents increasingly query databases, search document collections, call external APIs, remember past interactions, and act on a user's behalf.
Machine-generated by The Flow from the publisher's headline and feed description — not written or checked by a human. The full article lives at arXiv AI.
arXiv:2609.14003v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Personal AI agents built on large language models (LLMs) are increasingly given access to a user's private data and communications in order to provid...
Multi-agent large language model (LLM) systems can expose protected state through internal messages, tool arguments, logs, and persistent memory even when their public outputs appear innocuous. Existing privacy prompts, redaction methods, and source-level access controls restrict surface content or data access, but do not specify what a legitimately informed agent should disclose or how that disclosure may be reused downstream.
arXiv:2606. 28061v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) have increasingly moved from standalone text generation systems to agents that invoke external tools, access environments, and execute multi-step tasks.
arXiv:2607. 06595v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Personal AI agents powered by large language models can reason and act using available tools to access emails, manage calendars, and push code to remote repositories, all with minimal oversight.
The paper introduces AIM, a privacy‑aware memory framework that lets multi‑agent, multi‑user large language models manage both private and shared memory. AIM classifies data as private (user‑specific) or public (shared) and enforces index‑level access controls to protect sensitive information while enabling shared knowledge to improve coordination. The authors also present MUMBench, a new dataset for evaluating memory operations in multi‑user settings, and report high accuracy metrics for AIM on this benchmark.
BodhiPromptShield is a policy‑aware mediation layer for LLM agent pipelines that detects sensitive text spans before they propagate, replacing them with typed placeholders, semantic abstractions, or secure tokens and restoring them only at authorized execution boundaries. In evaluations on AI4Privacy, PrivacyLens, and AgentDojo datasets, the system reduces identifier exposure to 7.4% and 1.8% respectively, and limits exact identifier leakage in final actions to 2.1–3.1%. While mediation preserves factual content according to automated metrics, human annotations show a significant drop in inferability from 100% to 24–53%, indicating the need for human validation of semantic‑leakage measures.