arXiv AI
PrivacyGuard: Source-Linked Sanitization and Locally Resolvable PII References for Cloud GUI Agents
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arXiv AI
Jun 12
CAPED: Context-Aware Privacy Exposure Defense for Mobile GUI Agents
arXiv:2606. 12666v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Screenshot-based mobile GUI agents can operate ordinary smartphone apps through the same visual interface as a human user, but this capability also turns every screen observation into a privacy boundary.
arXiv Computer Vision
Sep 14
BodhiPromptShield: Pre-Inference Prompt Mediation for Surface-Form Privacy Propagation in LLM Agent Pipelines
BodhiPromptShield is a policy‑aware mediation layer for LLM agent pipelines that detects sensitive text spans before they propagate, replacing them with typed placeholders, semantic abstractions, or secure tokens and restoring them only at authorized execution boundaries. In evaluations on AI4Privacy, PrivacyLens, and AgentDojo datasets, the system reduces identifier exposure to 7.4% and 1.8% respectively, and limits exact identifier leakage in final actions to 2.1–3.1%. While mediation preserves factual content according to automated metrics, human annotations show a significant drop in inferability from 100% to 24–53%, indicating the need for human validation of semantic‑leakage measures.
arXiv AI
Oct 26
MCPHunt: An Evaluation Framework for Cross-Boundary Data Propagation in Multi-Server MCP Agents
MCPHunt is a benchmark framework that isolates non‑adversarial credential propagation across multi‑server MCP trust boundaries. It uses canary‑based taint tracking, a controlled coverage design with risky, benign, and hard‑negative conditions, and completion‑requires‑secret stratification to separate faithful from policy‑violating propagation. Across 3,615 traces from 5 models, policy‑violating propagation rates range from 11.5 % to 41.3 %, with mitigation via prompting reducing rates to 0.3 % while retaining 80.5 % utility.
arXiv AI
Jul 28
Agentic Permissions Policy Algebra for Taint Confinement in LLM Agents
arXiv:2607. 24625v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Autonomous LLM agents processing mixed-confidentiality data face severe security risks from prompt injection attacks and reasoning errors.
arXiv AI
Jun 2
PrivacyPeek: Auditing What LLM-Based Agents Acquire, Not Just What They Say
arXiv:2606. 00152v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM-based agents are rapidly advancing, autonomously invoking external tools to complete multi-step tasks for users.
arXiv AI
Oct 31
Judging Before Propagation: Task-Graph Contextual Integrity for Multi-Agent Privacy
The paper introduces Task-Graph Contextual Integrity (TG‑CI), a formalism that extends traditional Contextual Integrity to multi‑agent systems by modeling workflows as Multi‑Agent Task Graphs (MATGs). TG‑CI evaluates privacy not just at individual disclosures but across the entire downstream propagation, offering two enforcement policies—Full‑Scope and Auto‑Region—that balance privacy protection with task performance. A new benchmark, MAPLE‑Bench, demonstrates that TG‑CI can cut unauthorized disclosures by up to 94% while preserving over 94% of task accuracy compared to existing local‑history CI methods.