arXiv AI By Arseny Kravchenko, Vadim Liventsev, Innokentii Konstantinov, Ildar Iskhakov, Matvey Kukuy

Agentic Permissions Policy Algebra for Taint Confinement in LLM Agents

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arXiv:2607. 24625v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Autonomous LLM agents processing mixed-confidentiality data face severe security risks from prompt injection attacks and reasoning errors.

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arXiv AI
Jul 7

Securing Multi-Tool AI Agent Chains With Dynamic, Real-Time Compositional Policies

arXiv:2607. 03423v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Modern AI agent implementations such as frontier coding agents chain multiple tools at runtime that create a security surface that per-tool guardrails are unable to address, as individually permitted tools can violate organizational policies when composed.

By Chris Schneider, Kriti Faujdar, Philipp Schoenegger, Ben Bariach
arXiv AI
Sep 23

ActGov: Governing LLM Agent Actions via Policy-Constrained Validation

ActGov is a runtime enforcement framework that validates each action proposed by a large language model (LLM) agent before it interacts with external tools, ensuring that actions stay within task‑scoped authorization boundaries and comply with dynamically constructed policies. It builds policies from tool specifications, benign tasks, and failure traces, verifying updates via SMT‑based counterexample checking. In evaluations on AgentDojo and AgentDyn benchmarks, ActGov consistently reduces indirect prompt‑injection attack success while maintaining task utility, outperforming existing defenses.

By Kaiyuan Zhang, Yuke Peng, Ke Jiang, Yinqian Zhang