arXiv AI

Log-To-Leak: Prompt Injection Attacks on Tool-Using LLM Agents via the Model Context Protocol

arXiv AI
Oct 16

INFUSE: A Unified Surface Benchmark for Indirect Prompt Injection in Agentic Systems

INFUSE is a new benchmark that tests indirect prompt injection (IPI) in large‑language‑model agents performing long‑horizon workflows. It contains 40 realistic tasks and 56 attack scenarios across five threat categories, with attacks injected through realistic interaction surfaces rather than just initial prompts. The study evaluated 19 LLMs, generating over 41,000 adversarial trajectories and found mean attack success rates of 19.6% (LLM evaluation) and 15.4% (heuristic verification), while prompt‑level hardening reduced success from 58.2% to 14.3%.

By Thuy Dung Nguyen, Jingyi Guo, Rana Seda Dubauskas, Sreepriya Damuluru, Taylor T. Johnson, Kevin Leach
arXiv AI
Jun 2

AgentRedBench: Dynamic Redteaming and Integration-Aware Defense for LLM Agents over SaaS Integrations

arXiv:2606. 02240v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Indirect prompt injection in tool-use agents is a concrete production threat: LLM agents read from integrations (third-party services such as Gmail, Salesforce, or Jira accessed through tool calls) whose response content the user neither writes nor controls.

By Hiskias Dingeto, Will Leeney
arXiv Machine Learning
Jul 14

NetInjectBench: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injection in Tool-Using Large Language Model Agents for Network Operations

arXiv:2607. 10490v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Tool-using large language model (LLM) agents are attractive for network operations, but tickets, alerts, logs, runbooks, and ChatOps messages can carry indirect prompt injections.

By Ruksat Khan Shayoni, Muhammad Faraz Shoaib, S M Asif Hossain, M. F. Mridha
arXiv AI
Sep 2

Will the User Ever Know? Covert Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks on Tool-Using LLM Agents

The paper introduces covert indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks on tool‑using large language model agents, distinguishing between covert and overt successes. It defines new metrics—Covert Success Rate (CSR) and Overt Success Rate (OSR)—to capture whether users notice the injection. The authors propose ICoA, an attack that steers agents back to the user’s task after executing the injection, achieving higher CSR than existing methods on four target models.

By Yunseok Lee, Yunji Kim, Woojin Lee
arXiv AI
1d ago

AgentSentry: Mitigating Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM Agents via Temporal Causal Diagnostics and Context Purification

arXiv:2602.22724v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Tool-augmented large language model (LLM) agents aggregate dialogue history, tool outputs, and retrieved content into an accumulated runtime...

By Tian Zhang, Yiwei Xu, Juan Wang, Keyan Guo, Xiaoyang Xu, Bowen Xiao, Quanlong Guan, Jinlin Fan, Jiawei Liu, Zhiquan Liu, Hongxin Hu