arXiv AI

Prompts Don't Protect: Architectural Enforcement via MCP Proxy for LLM Tool Access Control

arXiv:2605. 18414v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models increasingly operate as autonomous agents that select and invoke tools from large registries.

arXiv Machine Learning
Jul 14

NetInjectBench: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injection in Tool-Using Large Language Model Agents for Network Operations

arXiv:2607. 10490v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Tool-using large language model (LLM) agents are attractive for network operations, but tickets, alerts, logs, runbooks, and ChatOps messages can carry indirect prompt injections.

By Ruksat Khan Shayoni, Muhammad Faraz Shoaib, S M Asif Hossain, M. F. Mridha
arXiv AI
Jul 22

Give Them an Inch and They Will Take a Mile:Understanding and Measuring Caller Identity Confusion in MCP-Based AI Systems

arXiv:2603. 07473v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The Model Context Protocol (MCP) is an open and standardized interface that enables large language models (LLMs) to interact with external tools and services, and is increasingly adopted by AI agents.

By Yuhang Huang, Boyang Ma, Biwei Yan, Xuelong Dai, Yechao Zhang, Minghui Xu, Kaidi Xu, Yue Zhang
arXiv AI
Jun 18

SafeClawBench: Separating Semantic, Audit-Evidence, and Sandbox Harm in Tool-Using LLM Agents

arXiv:2606. 18356v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Tool-using language-model agents introduce security failures that go beyond unsafe text: they can disclose protected objects, write persistent memory, send messages, modify databases, or trigger harmful code and tool effects.

By Yuchuan Tian, Mengyu Zheng, Haocheng Mei, Ye Yuan, Chao Xu, Xinghao Chen, Hanting Chen, Yu Wang