arXiv Computation and Language By Ziwen Li, Jianing Wen, Tianshi Li

LLM Anonymization Against Agentic Re-Identification

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The paper introduces AURA, an LLM-powered mask‑reconstruct framework for anonymizing text while preserving utility. It decouples privacy localization from utility‑preserving reconstruction and uses adversarial checks to select candidates. Experiments on real‑user interview transcripts show that AURA achieves the lowest agentic re‑identification rates among non‑DP methods and retains more contextual utility than prior LLM anonymizers.

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