Inverting Self-Triggered Control: Adversarial Reinforcement Learning for Sparse Denial-of-Service Attacks
Read the original on arXiv Machine Learning →The paper introduces an adversarial reinforcement learning framework that learns the sparsest Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack schedule capable of destabilizing self‑triggered reinforcement learning controllers (RL‑STC). It proves a lower bound on the minimum number of jamming actions needed to force a crash and demonstrates that the learned adversary consistently defeats four different defenders—one LQR and three RL‑STC—across Pendulum, CartPole, and Quadrotor2D environments, outperforming greedy and periodic baselines in jam‑time‑per‑failure. The study also shows that the adversary remains effective under Gaussian observation noise and limited state information.
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