arXiv:2607. 06643v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Backdoor attacks severely threaten large-scale AI models.
arXiv:2608.21137v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Decentralized Federated Learning (DFL) promises trust-free collaborative learning by replacing the centralized parameter server with peer-to-peer model...
arXiv:2601. 07674v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Random walk (RW)-based algorithms have long been popular in distributed systems due to low overheads and scalability, with recent growing applications in decentralized learning.
OVIG is an optimistic verification framework that audits AI training by replaying the process and comparing gradient differences against an empirically calibrated boundary. It treats any gradient difference exceeding this boundary as a malicious deviation. By partitioning training into stride‑s intervals and storing evidence only at interval endpoints, OVIG dramatically reduces off‑chain storage and transmission costs while maintaining zero attack success rate across language, vision, and diffusion workloads.
arXiv:2510. 09288v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The vulnerability of machine learning models to adversarial attacks remains a critical societal security challenge.
arXiv:2606. 09548v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Federated Learning (FL) allows a set of clients to collectively train a global model without sharing local training data.
The paper introduces Fed-ADR, a coordinated attack framework where a malicious orchestrator server directs heterogeneous adversarial clients to adapt their gradient updates in real time, thereby evading existing federated learning defenses and drastically reducing global model accuracy. It also presents a lightweight detection mechanism that estimates true client gradients from historical data to spot coordinated attacks, and an in-situ recovery method that restores model performance without restarting training. Experiments on MNIST, Fashion‑MNIST, and CIFAR‑10 show the attack can drop accuracy from over 90% to below 10%, while the defense can recover accuracy to above 90% within a few rounds at a computational cost at least 20× lower than retraining from scratch.
arXiv:2606. 10525v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Indirect prompt injection poses a critical threat to LLM agents that interact with untrusted external data, yet automated attack methods--proven effective for jailbreaking--remain underexplored in realistic agentic settings.
arXiv:2606. 19023v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The growing reliance on pre-trained Machine Learning (ML) models has introduced new attack surfaces.
The paper demonstrates that a single poisoned data point can successfully create a backdoor in linear models and ReLU neural networks without needing detailed knowledge of the training data. It establishes provable conditions under which this one‑poison attack works with high probability, achieving zero backdooring error while leaving the model’s normal performance largely unaffected. The attack relies only on coarse geometric bounds of the input space and training parameters.
arXiv:2608.21488v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: While machine learning models have demonstrated strong performance in many domains, these models have shown profound vulnerabilities when they are ex...
arXiv:2608. 06520v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study online cooperative control of a multi-agent system under Byzantine attacks.
arXiv:2608. 11495v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) serve as the backbone for high-stakes applications in Machine-Learning-as-a-Service (MLaaS).