How Do Document Parsers Break? Auditing Structural Vulnerability in Document Intelligence
Read the original on arXiv Computation and Language →The Flow has not summarised this story yet — read it at arXiv Computation and Language.
The Flow has not summarised this story yet — read it at arXiv Computation and Language.
WeVisDoc is a two‑stage data‑centric framework designed to improve end‑to‑end document parsing. Stage I expands coverage by adding heterogeneous data and applying structure‑preserving degradation synthesis, while Stage II evaluates residual errors with a held‑out probe and uses those diagnostics to target data construction and token budget reallocation. The resulting WeVisDoc‑4B model achieves an overall score of 95.38 on OmniDocBench v1.6 and outperforms competing parsers across all evaluated settings, with Stage II delivering notable gains on degraded tracks.
Transforming table-form documents into machine-processable records requires recovering not only their visible content but also the multilevel structure that organizes it. However, existing benchmarks evaluate either holistic document outputs or conventional table grids, and their aggregate scores provide little insight into where structural failures occur.
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