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arXiv AI By Diba Afroze, Xingli Zhang, Yazhou Tu, Xiali Hei

From Intent to Action: Benchmarking LLM Safety in Vehicle Voice Command Authorization

Read the original on arXiv AI →

The paper introduces a 202-scenario benchmark to evaluate how large language models (LLMs) handle safety-critical authorization decisions for vehicle voice commands. It tests two local open-weight models and three API-based LLMs, finding alignment scores ranging from 40.1% to 89.1% and noting persistent false execution errors. The study concludes that structured LLM decisions alone are insufficient for safety, recommending an independent enforcement layer to verify tool permissions and vehicle-state constraints before any vehicle function is invoked.

Machine-generated by The Flow from the publisher's headline and feed description — not written or checked by a human. The full article lives at arXiv AI.

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