arXiv:2606. 19683v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: This paper studies coalition formation as a decentralized dynamical process driven by unilateral exit-and-join decisions.
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arXiv:2606. 26139v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This paper develops a multiscale model of coalition formation in which strategic exit-and-join decisions are coupled with tactical consensus dynamics inside coalitions.
arXiv:2606. 28824v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This paper develops a continuum theory of exit-and-join coalition dynamics in nonatomic cooperative games.
arXiv:2607. 26788v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Clustered federated learning benefits from organizing heterogeneous participants into coalitions that train coalition-specific models, but such clustering is sustainable only if participants prefer their assigned coalition and the required transfers are affordable.
The paper investigates whether evolutionary stability guarantees that learning agents can achieve cooperative outcomes in a multi‑agent setting. Using a three‑agent governance game, the authors compare the evolutionary basin of attraction with learning basins derived from independent Q‑learning, scaled Boltzmann exploration, and SA–EA BQL. They find that while the evolutionary basin covers the entire sampled grid, only ε‑greedy Q‑learning attains a substantial learning basin, whereas the other methods fail to sustain cooperation, highlighting a disconnect between population‑level stability and finite‑sample learning accessibility.
arXiv:2510. 14907v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We extend the study of learning in games to dynamics that exhibit non-asymptotic stability.
Cooperation emergence is a central problem in multi-agent systems because decentralized agents must coordinate while adapting to the changing behavior of others. Evolutionary game theory identifies st...