The paper introduces ALERT‑BENCH, a benchmark that simulates enterprise security telemetry and evaluates how large‑language‑model agents triage alerts. Five common reasoning strategies—single‑pass tool use, iterative retrieval, sampled investigations, self‑review, and explicit verification—were tested on 1,247 alerts from a multi‑stage attack scenario, each missing at least 40.4% of attack‑related alerts. Building on these findings, the authors propose AIDA, a multi‑agent framework that enforces explicit decision proposals, independent challenges, and stronger evidence requirements, achieving an F1 score of 0.958 and reducing false‑negative alerts from 40.4% to 3.1% while escalating 18.4% to analysts.
By Saimon Amanuel Tsegai (Daphne), Alex Kantchelian (Daphne), Danfeng (Daphne), Yao, Peng Gao
arXiv:2608. 10669v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents combine language-based reasoning with external tools to perform complex tasks.
By Zixing Chen, Xingyuan Liu, Jie Zhu, Huaixia Dou, Shuo Jiang, Junhui Li, Lifan Guo, Feng Chen, Chi Zhang
AuditKIT is a source‑available evaluation library that unifies benchmark accuracy, judge‑based assessment, runtime performance, tool‑use behavior, and retrieval quality into a single result representation. It offers direction‑aware metric contracts, configuration fingerprints, and extensible metrics and backends, while providing turn‑aware tool‑call matching and distinguishing verified task outcomes from trajectory‑level diagnostics. Seven case studies demonstrate how answer extraction, runtime behavior, and metric selection can alter evaluation outcomes across model comparison, serving runtimes, retrieval, tool calling, and interoperability.
By Shreeyans Arora, Utsav Avaiya, Zera Lyngkhoi, Hem Gosalia, Ram Mohan Rao Kadiyala, Vinay Kumar Sankarapu, Pratinav Seth
arXiv:2607. 07474v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agentic red-teaming benchmarks report whether an injected agent was compromised as a single bit: the attack succeeded, or it did not.
By Harry Owiredu-Ashley
Production LLM agents such as Claude Code and Codex operate over untrusted content, files, commands, and workspace state, making safety failures directly actionable. Red-teaming must therefore keep pace with evolving models and tools.
CART (Closed‑Loop Adaptive Red Teaming) is a framework that iteratively uses results from red‑teaming tests to guide subsequent probes, thereby expanding risk coverage and maintaining diversity. It separates the roles of Challenger (test generator), Target (model or agent under test), and Judge (result evaluator), enabling independent study of each component. Across multiple evaluation families, CART uncovers more failures and higher risk than static prompt replay, demonstrating that adaptive, continuous testing reveals weaknesses that fixed‑prompt methods miss.
By Dongdong Zhang, Tengchao Lv, Yilin Jia, Yuzhong Zhao, Yupan Huang, Wenshan Wu, Xiangyang Zhou, Shaohan Huang, Nan Yang, Li Dong, Lei Cui, Furu Wei