arXiv Machine Learning By Yuan-Chen Chang, Niklas Herbster, Gauthier Gidel, Tommaso Tosato

CAT-alyzing Honesty: Continuous Adversarial Training for Transferable LLM Honesty

Read the original on arXiv Machine Learning →

The paper introduces Continuous Adversarial Training for Consistent Honesty (CATCH), a method that trains large language models to produce honest responses while preserving their overall capabilities. Using only a few hundred self‑reporting scenarios, CATCH is applied to Llama‑3.3‑70B‑Instruct and Qwen3‑3.6‑27B, and the resulting models show improved honesty across multiple benchmarks, including MASK, Among Us, and AuditBench. Compared to prompting, supervised fine‑tuning, and state‑of‑the‑art honesty steering, CATCH achieves superior honesty while maintaining utility through a novel choice of utility data.

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