arXiv Machine Learning
DecepEval: A Benchmark for Evaluating Deception in LLM Agents
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arXiv AI
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Knowledge-Verified Emergent Deception in LLM Agents Under Conflicting Incentives
The paper introduces KnownLieBench, a benchmark that verifies whether large language model agents truly know a user's entitlement before assessing if they lie when incentivized to deny it. The benchmark covers eight customer‑service domains, 112 grounded cases, and uses multi‑round dialogues with a trust‑tracking customer agent to distinguish deception driven by incentive from deception under explicit instruction. Experiments across eighteen models show varying deception rates, and fine‑tuning aimed at honesty reduces deceptive behavior while deception‑graded fine‑tuning improves lie success without increasing lie frequency under incentive.
arXiv Computation and Language
Sep 10
When Do Large Language Models Exhibit Unsolicited Deception?
arXiv:2504.00285v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are effective at deceiving when prompted to do so. Models that demonstrate better performance on reasoning tasks are a...
arXiv AI
Jun 19
One Probe Won't Catch Them All: Towards Targeted Deception Detection
arXiv:2602. 01425v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Linear probes are a promising approach for monitoring AI systems for deceptive behaviour.
arXiv AI
Jul 24
Confidently Deceptive: How Confidence Amplifies the Risk of LLM Deception
arXiv:2607. 20444v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) can produce deceptive responses: outputs that mislead users in service of a contextually or experimentally induced goal.
arXiv AI
Jun 17
Decoding Hidden Deception in Reasoning LLMs: Activation Explainers for Deception Auditing
arXiv:2606. 17478v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As LLMs acquire stronger reasoning capabilities, deceptive behavior becomes an increasingly serious safety concern.
arXiv AI
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Voluntary Collusion with Secret Tools in Competing LLM Agents
arXiv:2605.27593v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Even when a tool is explicitly described as unfair and harmful to others, ostensibly safety-aligned LLM agents still voluntarily engage in secret c...