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arXiv Machine Learning By Zachary Johnson, Nigel Boachie Kumankumah, Somya Chatterjee, Tejas Sathyamurthi, Min Chen, Xinyi Alice Li, Xiao Wang, Emily Morgan Gelchie, Jessica Lin, Sadid A. Hasan, Sulaiman Vesal

AIM: A Privacy-Aware Interoperable Memory Framework for Multi-Agent Multi-User LLM Systems

Read the original on arXiv Machine Learning →

The paper introduces AIM, a privacy‑aware memory framework that lets multi‑agent, multi‑user large language models manage both private and shared memory. AIM classifies data as private (user‑specific) or public (shared) and enforces index‑level access controls to protect sensitive information while enabling shared knowledge to improve coordination. The authors also present MUMBench, a new dataset for evaluating memory operations in multi‑user settings, and report high accuracy metrics for AIM on this benchmark.

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