Hugging Face Trending Papers

MNC: Scope-Bound Semantic Declassification for Private LLM-Agent Communication

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Multi-agent large language model (LLM) systems can expose protected state through internal messages, tool arguments, logs, and persistent memory even when their public outputs appear innocuous. Existing privacy prompts, redaction methods, and source-level access controls restrict surface content or data access, but do not specify what a legitimately informed agent should disclose or how that disclosure may be reused downstream.

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arXiv AI
Sep 23

Trustworthy Agentic AI: Failure Modes, Mitigation Strategies, and a Lifecycle Framework for Autonomous LLM Systems

The paper discusses the trustworthiness of agentic AI systems built on large language models, highlighting new security and operational risks such as indirect prompt injection, memory contamination, and cross‑session data leakage. It categorizes failure modes, reviews mitigation strategies—including instruction hierarchies, context isolation, and constrained tool use—and introduces the Trustworthy Agent Development Lifecycle (TADL), a six‑phase framework for specification, design, training, evaluation, deployment, and monitoring. The authors note that TADL has not yet been empirically validated but offers a structured foundation for developing more secure and accountable agentic systems, and they call for improved benchmarks and future research priorities.

By Fayeq Jeelani Syed, Rehan Ahmad, Ali Al Bataineh, Aakriti Adhikari
arXiv AI
Sep 21

CIPL: A Channel-Aware Framework for Recoverable Privacy Leakage in LLM Agents

CIPL (Channel Inversion for Privacy Leakage) is a channel-aware framework designed to evaluate black-box privacy leakage in large language model agents. It models the leakage process through stages of sensitive source, selection, assembly, execution, observation, and extraction, assessing how selected sensitive units become attacker-recoverable outputs. Experiments across memory, retrieval, and tool-mediated targets, plus a live-agent case study, reveal that recoverability depends on factors beyond storage labels, such as observation surface, prompt alignment, retrieval depth, and provider behavior, and that a semantic audit can uncover disclosures missed by exact matching.

By Tao Huang, Guosen Wu, Guolong Zheng, Jiayang Meng, Chen Hou, Xu Yang, Xuechao Yang, Feng Xia