arXiv:2607. 23002v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models increasingly write both code and the tests meant to check it; coverage records what ran, not what was verified.
Summary generated by The Flow from the publisher's feed. The full article lives at arXiv AI.
arXiv:2606. 24589v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Scaling adversarial evaluation of large language models requires both a method for generating hard inputs and a reliable way to confirm that resulting failures are real.
arXiv:2607. 11022v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The test suites used as RLVR rewards for code have natural false positives: per-task, persistent, asymmetric errors that accept the same wrong programs every time they appear, unlike the symmetric or resampled noise assumed by existing noise-robustness analyses.
End-to-end task-success is the dominant way to evaluate LLM agents, but one aggregate number tells you that an agent regressed, not where. We present layer-isolated evaluation: a deployed ordering agent is decomposed into a fixed taxonomy of layers (ontology, intent, routing, decomposition, escalation, safety, memory, and cross-cutting envelope/defense), each exercised by its own assertion slice in a deterministic, no-LLM "pure" mode.
arXiv:2606. 31511v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: In deployment settings where retraining is infeasible, small frozen code models are routinely asked to repair a failed program after seeing their own failing output, usually treated as a retry mechanism.
arXiv:2607. 28871v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: When a repair agent runs a test and sees it pass, the result is treated as evidence about the reported defect.
arXiv:2607. 06596v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Trusted monitoring is a central defense in AI control: a cheaper trusted model scores an untrusted model's actions for sabotage, and the most suspicious are audited or deferred.