arXiv:2607. 06596v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Trusted monitoring is a central defense in AI control: a cheaper trusted model scores an untrusted model's actions for sabotage, and the most suspicious are audited or deferred.
arXiv:2608. 16190v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Trusted monitoring has a cheap, trusted model score a stronger untrusted model's actions, and a diverse ensemble of them beats a single stronger monitor at matched cost.
arXiv:2607. 13075v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Context can change whether a request is harmful without changing its topic or surface form.
arXiv:2606. 10456v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI-control monitors score individual agent actions to detect misbehavior, but real harm can be distributed across many benign-looking steps, each individually below any per-step alarm.
arXiv:2607. 23002v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models increasingly write both code and the tests meant to check it; coverage records what ran, not what was verified.
arXiv:2607. 11751v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As multi-agent, tool-using LLM systems are deployed, a common safety net is a runtime monitor that checks each message, tool call, or step on its own.
arXiv:2606. 00813v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety alignment in LLMs does not improve monotonically across model generations.
arXiv:2607. 19321v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As AI agents begin to automate AI R&D, we need ways to assess whether their outputs are safe to deploy, even when the agents themselves may be untrusted.
arXiv:2607. 01239v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Character-level perturbations bypass safety alignment in modern LLMs despite leaving prompts human-readable.
arXiv:2607. 13346v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Alignment faking is dangerous because a model can appear compliant under monitoring while preserving behavior it would reveal when unmonitored.
arXiv:2608. 00583v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Chain-of-thought (CoT) monitoring is meant to catch the reward hacks that look clean in the actions and betray themselves only in the reasoning.
arXiv:2606. 04035v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We present a systematic study of domain-dependent safety behavior in open-weight LLMs: 7 standardized experiments across 7 ethical domains, testing 5 models (12B--70B) in 4,200 interactions with dual-judge validation.
arXiv:2608. 14617v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A recurring proposal in legal AI is to improve case-outcome prediction by fusing uncertainty tools (evidence graphs with belief propagation, sequential Bayesian odds updating, Dempster-Shafer combination, and conformal prediction) into one pipeline.