arXiv:2608. 16190v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Trusted monitoring has a cheap, trusted model score a stronger untrusted model's actions, and a diverse ensemble of them beats a single stronger monitor at matched cost.
By Anik Jha
arXiv:2607. 13075v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Context can change whether a request is harmful without changing its topic or surface form.
By Dominik Schwarz
arXiv:2606. 10456v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI-control monitors score individual agent actions to detect misbehavior, but real harm can be distributed across many benign-looking steps, each individually below any per-step alarm.
By Zhang Qinqin, Gao Yuze
arXiv:2607. 23002v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models increasingly write both code and the tests meant to check it; coverage records what ran, not what was verified.
By Jeff Otterson (W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University)
arXiv:2607. 11751v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As multi-agent, tool-using LLM systems are deployed, a common safety net is a runtime monitor that checks each message, tool call, or step on its own.
By Yibo Hu, Ren Wang
arXiv:2606. 00813v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety alignment in LLMs does not improve monotonically across model generations.
By Subhadip Mitra