arXiv Computation and Language

When 200 OK Is Not an Answer: Silent Fetch Failures in Agentic Web Content Acquisition

The study investigates how often web agents incorrectly treat an HTTP 200 response as a successful fetch of useful content. By sampling 10,307 URLs—including random paths and expert‑verified claim citations—the authors found that roughly 20–25% of 200 responses lack the page’s main content, leading to inflated estimates of claim verifiability and citation drift. They propose simple heuristics and classifiers to detect unusable responses, achieving high recall with low false‑alarm rates, and recommend that agents report fetch outcomes explicitly.

arXiv Computation and Language
Sep 16

RiskChainBench: A Benchmark for Obfuscated Platform Message Restoration and Evidence-Grounded Web Investigation

RiskChainBench is a new benchmark that pairs 3,600 synthetic token‑text restoration inputs with 600 human‑labeled local web environments to evaluate how well models can recover obfuscated platform messages and then investigate the associated websites. The benchmark measures both message restoration accuracy and the subsequent web‑investigation decision, using a fixed multimodal evidence judge to assess faithfulness, sufficiency, completeness, and consistency. Across ten models, performance varies widely, with entry recovery ranging from 35.2% to 95.2% and web decision accuracy from 26.3% to 62.8%, highlighting execution failures as the main bottleneck.

By ZhuoXin Liu, Zhiming Ma, Ying Zhang, Mengzheng Yang, Yifan Wang, Zhengqi Huang, Yanhan Zhou, Zekun Lin, Jun Zhang, Shun Zhang, Yue Chen, Qiao Zhao, Peng Chen
arXiv AI
Sep 4

Identifying AI Web Scrapers Using Canary Tokens

The paper introduces a method to detect which web scrapers feed data to large language models (LLMs) by deploying dynamic websites that issue unique canary tokens to each scraper. By querying LLMs for information about these sites, the authors can identify when an LLM consistently outputs the unique tokens, indicating exposure to a specific scraper. Experiments on 22 production LLM systems show the technique reliably uncovers both known and undisclosed scrapers, offering a tool for third parties to monitor and control unwanted web scraping.

By Steven Seiden, Triss Ren, Caroline Zhang, Taein Kim, Enze Liu, Emily Wenger
arXiv AI
Aug 28

TriShieldRAG: 3 Rings, One Blind Spot in Layered Defenses for Retrieval-Augmented Generation

TriShieldRAG introduces a three‑layered defense for Retrieval‑Augmented Generation: an Ingest Guard that screens documents, a Retrieval Scorer that re‑ranks based on trust, and a Cross‑LLM Consensus that validates evidence across three models. Against the original PoisonedRAG attack on the 2.68M‑passage Natural Questions corpus, the framework reduces attack success from about 79% to 1%. However, adaptive attacks that only alter document formatting can bypass the Ingest Guard and still achieve high success rates, revealing limits of layered defenses that rely on the same retrieved evidence.

By Susil Kumar Mohanty, Rohit Patel, Kosuru Yuvaraj, Jeenal Chaudhary, Disha Singhania
arXiv AI
Sep 10

AtomCite: Verification and Correction of Supplied Page-Level Citations in Multi-Page Documents

AtomCite is an agentic framework that verifies and corrects page‑level citations in multi‑page documents by parsing answers into claims, checking each claim against the cited page image, and applying a deterministic repair policy. The authors introduce DocCite, the first benchmark for this task, built on MP‑DocVQA and DUDE, containing 928 injected instances and 1,909 verified natural errors. Across Gemini, Claude, and GPT models, AtomCite achieves about 93% verification accuracy and improves citation precision from 34% to 87‑90%, while also enhancing hallucination detection in open‑source models.

By Chen Qian, Yimeng Wang, Yu Chen, Lingfei Wu, Andreas Stathopoulos
arXiv AI
6d ago

WebAnything: From the Wild Web to Scalable Agent Environments

WebAnything is a fully automated framework that reconstructs source‑grounded, reusable web environments from real URLs without per‑site manual engineering. It uses an Explorer‑Builder to collect browser‑observable structures and an independent verifier to ensure fidelity, producing 244 website artifacts across 14 domains and 53 categories with 12,984 executed tasks. Compared to human‑assisted WebHarbor, WebAnything scores higher on three fidelity metrics and, when fine‑tuned with Qwen3.5‑9B, improves success rates across multiple benchmarks.

By Tianci Xie, Zikun Cai, Chaoyun Zhang, Pinxue Guo, Bingxuan Li, Rui Zheng, Hang Yan
arXiv AI
Jun 2

Cookie-Bench: Continuous On-screen Key Interaction Evaluation for Web Generation

arXiv:2605. 30000v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Front-end web code has become a core product surface for every frontier LLM release, yet evaluating these interactive applications at development speed remains costly because human-judged leaderboards like Arena do not scale.

By Haoyue Yang, Zhangxiao Shen, Fan Ding, Hangting Lou, Yifeng Kou, Haoqing Yu, Jingyao Li, Zhengfan Wu, Siqi Bao, Jing Liu, Hua Wu
arXiv AI
Oct 7

The Right Memory in the Wrong Context: Verifying Retrieval Admissibility in Long-Term Agent Memory

The paper presents a retrieval‑admissibility verification framework for long‑term memory agents, classifying each memory‑query pair as admissible, inadmissible, or unresolved. It evaluates the framework on public benchmarks (RHELM and MemOps), showing improved anchor recall and reduced exact similarity errors, while also revealing that existing verifiers miss certain inadmissible exposures. The study highlights the need for separate checks on candidate support, admissibility, prompt exposure, and answer disclosure to ensure safe memory retrieval.

By Zi Wang, Xingqiao Wang, Emmanuel Addai, Devika Ambekar, Xiaowei Xu