Relevance as a Vulnerability: How Web Retrieval Degrades Safety Alignment in LLM Agents
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arXiv:2606. 00686v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The prevailing paradigm in large language model (LLM) alignment operates via erasure, filtering unsafe data or training models to strictly refuse harmful prompts.
arXiv:2608. 04565v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM-based search agents are widely used for information-seeking tasks, but their reliance on external tool returns introduces a critical security risk: web content retrieved during execution is untrusted, exposing agents to prompt injection and goal hijacking.
arXiv:2603. 00801v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Language agents increasingly act as web-enabled systems that search, browse, and synthesize information from diverse sources.
RAG-Safety-Bench is a benchmark designed to evaluate how retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) affects the safety of large language models (LLMs). It isolates safety impacts by testing four conditions: non-RAG, RAG with an oracle document, RAG with related but non-answer documents, and RAG with random safe documents. Results on five open-source LLMs reveal an inverse relationship between benign and unsafe capabilities, show that baseline safety guardrails do not guarantee safety in RAG, and confirm that even benign documents can trigger unsafe generation.
arXiv:2610.23093v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM agents increasingly use retrieval tools across languages, yet their safety evaluation remains English-centric. It remains unclear whether language...
RAG-Safety-Bench is a benchmark designed to evaluate how retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) affects the safety of large language models (LLMs). It isolates safety impacts by testing four conditions: non-RAG, RAG with an oracle document, RAG with related but non-answer documents, and RAG with random safe documents. Results on five open-source LLMs reveal an inverse relationship between benign and unsafe capabilities, show that standard safety guardrails do not guarantee safety in RAG, and confirm that even benign documents can trigger unsafe outputs.