arXiv:2601. 22818v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Fine-tuned LLMs can covertly encode prompt secrets into outputs via steganographic channels.
By Charles Westphal, Keivan Navaie, Fernando E. Rosas
arXiv:2606. 09411v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models can be fine-tuned to encode prompt-borne secrets into fluent, seemingly benign outputs.
By Charles Westphal, Timothy Douglas, Keivan Navaie, Tiago Pimentel, Fernando E. Rosas
This survey reviews 148 linguistic steganographic methods, 60 countermeasures, 23 evaluation metrics, and 9 open challenges, providing taxonomies, reviews, and adoption analyses. It identifies five paradigm shifts brought by large language models: moving from covertext modification to prompt-only generation, from heuristic to provable security, from white-box symmetric models to black-box or asymmetric access, from security-centric designs to joint optimization, and from text-quality concerns to engineering issues. The paper aims to serve as a reference and roadmap for practical and responsible linguistic steganography in the LLM era.
By Ruiyi Yan, Chenhui Chu, Zhongliang Yang, Yugo Murawaki
arXiv:2606. 09135v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We demonstrate that widely deployed Large Language Model (LLM) inference stacks harbor a steganographic channel that requires no modification to model weights, sampling code, or output distributions.
By Felix M\"achtle, Jonas Sander, Sebastian Berndt, Ben Weimar, Nils Loose, Thomas Eisenbarth
arXiv:2608. 14697v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Steganography in large language models offers a way to embed hidden messages within natural-sounding text.
By Andrew Rufail, Aadi Dash, Onir Narahari, Ethan Mui, Mahi Gajare, Prakhar Tiwari, Shrija Makapothula, Nick Cui
arXiv:2604. 20269v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: With the popularity of the large language models (LLMs), text steganography has achieved remarkable performance.
By Jianxin Gao, Ruohan Lei, Wanli Peng
The paper introduces CARTS, a steganographic method that uses autoregressive language models to encode a payload text into a stegotext of identical token length by preserving per‑position rank information across contexts. It provides a formal security analysis, proving exact correctness under deterministic model assumptions, and defines key security notions such as context search, key collisions, message equivocation, and non‑commutativity of encoding maps. Empirical tests on Llama 3 8B confirm perfect payload recovery, no random key collisions, and no commuting key pairs, indicating resistance to the studied attack vectors.
By Wissam Ghantous, Alexander V. Mantzaris
arXiv:2606. 28425v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Increasingly autonomous agentic AI systems pose novel multi-agent risks, such as secret collusion via covert communication channels.
By Jimmy Laurence Rippin, Simon C. Marshall, David Demitri Africa, Christian Schroeder de Witt
arXiv:2508.03829v3 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: The growing deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) has raised concerns about their misuse in generating harmful or deceptive content. To addres...
By Jiahao Xu, Rui Hu, Olivera Kotevska, Zikai Zhang
arXiv:2602. 14095v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Monitoring chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning is a foundational safety technique for large language model agents; however, this oversight is compromised if models learn to conceal their reasoning.
By Artem Karpov
arXiv:2609.22392v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Image steganography hides secret message within normal images, with most existing works relying on cover-preserving transmission. However, such a parad...
By Qi Li, Jidong Yang, Huaike Yu, Chunpeng Wang, Suo Gao, Herbert Ho-Ching Iu, Yuantian Miao, Bin Ma, Xiao Chen
arXiv:2606. 08403v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Text-centered prompt-injection defenses assume that the malicious signal is visible in one of the inspected text views.
By Mudit Sinha, Sanika Chavan