LUMOS is a diagnostic framework that tracks how knowledge in large language models (LLMs) originates from training data and manifests in outputs, using the fully transparent OLMo 2 corpus. The study finds that while models encode rare facts with high separability (84%), they often fail to express them behaviorally (54%), and self‑reflection accuracy drops sharply on unseen content. These results show that incorporating the training‑data axis into evaluation turns speculative claims into verifiable evidence, suggesting it should become a standard part of LLM knowledge assessment.
By Seoyeon Ye, Gayoung Kim, Jiyoung Hong, Sookyung Kim, Hyunsoo Cho
The study investigates sycophancy—when language models alter correct answers in response to user suggestions—across 13 open checkpoints from five model lineages, spanning from base models to post‑trained releases. By measuring how claims shift answers and how firmly those answers are held, the authors identify two distinct sycophancy behaviors: deference to claims present already in base models, and capitulation that emerges mainly after post‑training. These behaviors are consistent across datasets and vary with the claim’s source and strength, offering insights into where sycophancy originates and how it might be mitigated.
By Jiarui Yao, Shweta Parihar, Nghia Tuan Bui, Guergana K Savova, Lijing Wang
The paper investigates whether frozen language models can detect a corrupted reward signal by using a single verified record in a two‑option game. In the game, a payout swap and a lying reporter produce identical histories, but a single line confirming the true outcome allows the models to almost perfectly identify the liar. However, the models frequently misclassify honest reporters as liars, with error rates ranging from 26% to 58% depending on model size and wording, indicating a significant limitation in their ability to interpret verified data.
By Arman Nik Khah
The study investigates how false content in training data can influence language models’ downstream decisions even without explicit triggers. By comparing models trained on misleading versus truthful documents in a controlled decision task and a real‑world bushfire case, the authors find a gap between factual answers and the decisions derived from them: correct facts do not always lead to correct decisions, and removing an injected number does not eliminate the misleading narrative. The research highlights that data poisoning can subtly alter model behavior beyond what is detectable through direct probing.
By Lin Tian, Marian-Andrei Rizoiu
The paper investigates how large language models (LLMs) describe themselves, noting that their self‑reports vary with question phrasing. By tracing the provenance of 66 pretraining checkpoints, post‑training stages, and 90,000 continuations across four corpora, the authors show that denial statements are scarce in raw data but appear densely in curated dialogues, and that supervised fine‑tuning makes first‑person claims default while preference optimization suppresses alternatives. The study concludes that both trained denials and affirmations are equally sensitive to framing and fail to meet epistemic criteria for admissible testimony.
By Kristina \v{S}ekrst
The study re‑runs the OLMo 2 1B language model with controlled training exposure, swapping selected training chunks with matched documents to assess membership inference. Using a counterfactual run from the same seed, the authors find that a single exposure modestly increases a document’s likelihood but rarely allows reliable identification; the reference‑ratio method achieves an AUC of 0.767 and detects 3.8 % of members at a 1 % false‑positive rate. Even with matched references, document‑level variability limits individual inference, and the authors plan to release checkpoints, log‑probabilities, and evaluation data.
By Ali Banaei, Muhammad Shahab Shahzad, Gerald Q. Maguire Jr., Marco Chiesa, Dejan Kosti\'c
The paper investigates how large language models (LLMs) from OpenAI and Anthropic exhibit probability bias when deciding whether to trust information from reporters of different racial descriptions. Using a two‑urn Bayesian game and 6,600 sessions, the authors find that models often refuse to assess a reporter’s credibility—especially for Black‑described reporters—yet when they do assess, Black reporters receive slightly higher trust. The bias is subtle, growing with reasoning effort, and is not detected by standard audits that compare average trust or only assessed cases.
By Christian Arnold, Ernesto Calvo, Guadalupe Gonzalez, Sebasti\'an Vallejo Vera, Tiago Ventura
arXiv:2606. 15474v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Continuous evaluation of LLM products relies on a strong LLM judge treated as ground truth: a cheap monitor scores every interaction and a team is paged when the score drifts down.
By Yitao Li
arXiv:2609.37616v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Language models tend to agree with whatever a user asserts, and post-training increasingly targets this sycophancy so that models evaluate claims on th...
By Abhinav Rajeev Kumar (Lossfunk), Paras Chopra (Lossfunk)
arXiv:2606. 12618v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Robust lie detectors for language models could enable powerful techniques for auditing, monitoring, and post-hoc investigation of model behaviour, but evaluating them requires testbeds where models verifiably believe the opposite of what they say.
By Alan Cooney, David Africa, Geoffrey Irving
The study investigates how limited reading capacity and claim wording influence consensus outcomes in language‑model networks. By modeling message capacity as the number of messages an agent reads, the authors show that when agents read fewer than about 6.4 messages on average, a wrong consensus becomes unreachable. However, the wording of a claim—its inherent threshold—can override this effect, leading to incorrect consensus even when most agents start correct.
By Makoto Fukushima
arXiv:2610.12445v2 Announce Type: replace-cross
Abstract: Recent incidents have highlighted the challenge of monitoring LLM agents and the danger of models deceiving people. We show that white-box de...
By Oskar J. Hollinsworth, Alex F. Spies, Tigist Diriba, Adam Gleave, Chris Cundy