arXiv AI By Kristina \v{S}ekrst

Who Put the I in AI? Provenance and the Admissibility of Machine Self-Report

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The paper investigates how large language models (LLMs) describe themselves, noting that their self‑reports vary with question phrasing. By tracing the provenance of 66 pretraining checkpoints, post‑training stages, and 90,000 continuations across four corpora, the authors show that denial statements are scarce in raw data but appear densely in curated dialogues, and that supervised fine‑tuning makes first‑person claims default while preference optimization suppresses alternatives. The study concludes that both trained denials and affirmations are equally sensitive to framing and fail to meet epistemic criteria for admissible testimony.

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