arXiv AI

PiMRef: Deducing Ever-evolving Spear-phishing Emails with Knowledge Base Invariants

arXiv AI
Oct 15

Same Attack, Different Judge: A First Controlled Adversarial Comparison of Jev, LLM Judges, and Purpose-Built Safety Classifiers

The paper evaluates TypeSafe AI’s Jev safety judge against GPT and GLM judges and local classifiers using a controlled adversarial test harness. Jev shows strong robustness on rule‑based tasks like input moderation, with minimal bypasses, but performs less well on judgment‑based tasks such as phishing detection, where it misses a higher proportion of phishing emails and is more prone to false positives. The study highlights Jev’s speed advantage and varying resilience depending on task type.

By Xiang Li, Aichun Huang, Mingming Zhang, Zheli Liu
arXiv AI
Sep 10

CoGReV: A Confidence-Gated Post-Hoc Non-Monotonic Belief Revision Framework for Phishing Website Classification

CoGReV is a hybrid framework that enhances machine‑learning phishing classifiers with a post‑hoc, non‑monotonic reasoning layer written in Answer Set Programming. It uses a confidence‑gated defeasible rule to revise low‑confidence phishing predictions toward legitimate only when website metadata is available, thereby allocating uncertain decisions to the reasoning layer while leaving confident ones to the classifier. The gated rule reduces false positives by 0.27 % of decisions and maintains recall within 0.7 % of the baseline, operating in linear time.

By Mainak Sen, Kumar Sankar Ray, Amlan Chakrabarti
arXiv Computation and Language
Oct 27

"I Strongly Suspect This Website Is a Scam": Benchmarking PII Leakage and Detection without Defense in Autonomous Web Agents

arXiv:2606.00497v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Deceptive web content, widely instantiated across the internet and commonly known as \textit{social-engineering attacks}, manipulates autonom...

By Soham Roy, Sarthakbrata Halder, Arya Bharaty, Vaibhav Bhaskar, Yash Sinha, Dhruv Kumar, Srikant Panda, Murari Mandal
arXiv Computation and Language
Sep 28

Prompt Injection Detection for Email Agents Through Attack Chain Modeling

The paper introduces a prompt‑injection detection framework for email assistants that models attacks as a chain of stages. It combines a text detector, stage‑specific verifiers, rule‑based risk signals, user intent consistency checks, and a logistic decision policy. Experiments on five benchmarks show the framework outperforms pretrained detectors, achieving a mean F1 of 0.406 versus 0.216, and demonstrate that training on benign emails resembling attacks reduces false alarms.

By Ahmad Hashmi, Dhyey Patel, Yunting Yin