arXiv AI By Yuchen Ling, Shengcheng Yu, Zhenyu Chen, Chunrong Fang

Toward Secure LLM Agents: Threat Surfaces, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluation

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arXiv:2606. 10749v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents are rapidly moving from conversational interfaces to software components that plan, invoke tools, maintain memory, and act on external environments.

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